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Introduction 
Somaliland in the northern tip of the Horn of Africa is bounded by Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
‘Puntland State’ of north-east Somalia, and Yemen across the Red Sea. The people 
of Somaliland are ethnic Somali, sharing with other Somalis a common language, 
religion, Sunni Islam, and a traditional livelihood system based around nomadic 
pastoralism.  Most come from three main ‘clan families’ - the Isaaq, Dir (Gadabursi 
and 'Iise) and Harti (Warsengeli and Dulbahante) of the Darod clan federation. The 
Isaaq, the most populous and the politically and economically dominant group, divide 
into six main sub-lineages.  These sub-clans and the dynamic divisions and alliances 
between them have at times represented critical factions in Somaliland’s politics. 
Historically Somalis were largely nomadic pastoralists. Customary political affiliation 
is based on kinship, with economic activity, culture, individual and collective rights 
and economic security mediated through clan. Entitlement to resources, divisions of 
labour and authority came through social contract between and among clans (known 
as heer or xeer). Decision-making was through consensus amongst adult males, with 
all activity including conflict, subject to widely recognised norms of behaviour. The 
social structure remains heavily patriarchal despite the presence of highly educated 
women, many with time spent in the diaspora, involved in politics, civil society and 
business.  
 
After being a British protectorate since 1884, Somaliland became an independent 
country on June 26, 1960. The rest of present-day Somalia, then administered by 
Italy, became independent several days later. Within days, the two lands decided to 
merge. But Somalilanders felt slighted almost from the start, since most of the 
power went to the south of the country. Somalilanders rejected a referendum  
on a unitary constitution in June 1961 and, later that year, military 
officers in Hargeisa began an unsuccessful rebellion to reassert 
Somaliland's independence. 
 
Over the years, especially from 1982 onwards the leaders in Mogadishu fought to 
keep control of Somaliland. In 1988, a full-scale civil war broke out between the 
Mogadishu-based government and Somaliland rebels grouped in the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) – founded in London in 1981 - and which had been fighting the 
regime in northwest Somalia since 1982. Secession in fact was never a publicly 
stated objective of the SNM, although there were secessionists, especially among 
the military commanders.  The initial objective was to overthrow the dictatorship and 
replace it with a democratic political system including greater devolution. The 
declaration of independence was in part at least due to popular demand from 
Somalilanders, particularly from the Isaaq clans, from whom the SNM drew its 
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support. Significantly, though, the non-Isaaq Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante also 
committed considerable effort to the Somaliland project in the early days. When the 
United Somali Congress (USC) announced the formation of a government in 
Mogadishu without consultation, Isaaq fears about southern domination were 
revived, and on this occasion, many Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante shared that fear. 
On 18 May 1991, as Somalia descended into anarchy with the fall of the government 
of Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, leaders of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and 
elders of northern clans meeting at the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples in 
Burco revoked the 1960 Act of Union that had joined the former Italian and British 
colonies. The new Somaliland contained the territory of the former British 
Protectorate bordering Djibouti to the west, the Gulf of Aden to the north, Ethiopia to 
the west and Somalia to the east in line with nineteenth century international treaties. 
The territory covers 137,600 km and incorporates the five former regions of 
northwest Somalia – Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed (since renamed Maroodi Jeex), 
Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool – and a sixth region – Saaxil – created in 1996. The 
largest city, Hargeisa, is the commercial centre, political capital and the Somaliland 
seat of government.  Since 1998, Somaliland’s authority over eastern Sanaag and 
Sool regions has been contested by the semi-autonomous Somali territory of 
Puntland with occasional violent conflict. 
On 27 July 2010, Dahir Riyale Kahin, President since 2003 of the internationally-
unrecognised Republic of Somaliland, conceded power peacefully to his successor 
Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo. The new President had been the victor in a 
presidential election held one month earlier. This event marked both change and 
continuity – a change of government (from the UDUB party to Kulmiye) as well as 
president, but continuity in taking further steps on Somaliland’s journey to 
democracy.  
The holding of the presidential elections on the scheduled date (26 June 2010) 
marked a major turnaround from before September 2009. By that stage, political 
party infighting had caused repeated delays from the original 2008 date and the 
prospects for successful elections looked bleak. The deadlock was finally broken 
when a six-point agreement was signed on 30 September 2009.  
Democratisation and Indigenous Models 
While the southern areas of Somalia endure endemic conflict, despite internationally-
brokered ‘top-down’ peace conferences, Somaliland began a home-grown process of 
‘bottom-up’ reconciliation and state-building, mostly free from foreign prescriptions or 
interventions. It remains internationally unrecognised, but has held elections for the 
head of state (twice), the lower house of parliament and local councils.  
 
Somaliland has been engaged on a journey to build systems of legitimate and 
accountable governance with some form of social contract with civil society (a term 
we might dispute in relation to Somaliland but let us use it for the time being). The 
proclamation of independence in 1991 meant that the new state had the opportunity 
to break with past corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government.  While 
the lack of international recognition has meant a lack of governance support granted 
to many post-conflict countries, this has given Somalilanders the opportunity to build 
their own system suitable for their needs.  For the first twelve years this has 
consisted of what has been termed a ‘hybrid’ system, combining traditional 
institutions of clan governance with at least some formal Western-style government 
institutions. In May 1999 the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the 
current clan-based system to a multiparty political system provided the proposed 
parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all (then) five 
regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were consulted in 
drawing up the draft.  
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Against this background and the chronic failure of Somalia, Somaliland appears an 
example of successful, indigenous state-building. Many see lessons for Somalia and 
the Horn of Africa. It is vaunted as the first indigenous, modern African form of 
government to achieve stability through a regime employing traditional social 
systems within a democratising framework. Somaliland is not a developmental state, 
but has provided significant stability and security for its citizens. The state remains 
weak and poorly-funded, with an economy marked by widespread poverty, little 
domestic production and probably unsustainable remittance-based consumption. 
There has been a lack of transparency in public finance management with little 
parliamentary oversight. From our perspective, the view that Somaliland is a hybrid of 
‘modernisation’ and ‘traditional’ (clan) practices bears some validity but fails to factor 
in the complex and changing contestation of securocrats, past and present 
diasporas, political Islamists, women’s groups, international and domestic civil 
society, and the space granted to outsiders in negotiations.  Somaliland has rather 
been shaped by a combination of and conflicts between ‘nightwatchmen’ and 
securocrats, and democratising and traditional or patriarchal forms – all of which hold 
significant developmental implications. 
 
Much of the process of democratisation has been driven by a public desire to avoid a 
return to conflict accompanied by an urge to win international recognition, although 
yoking the two has proved problematic. In 1999 the then President Egal pronounced 
that recognition would only come through democratisation – meaning democracy was 
seen as instrumental rather than an inherent good and built on formal electoral 
processes. One aspect missing was the understanding that viable governance entails 
a two-way relationship with civil society based on respect for autonomy and the 
division of labour, including the tracking of government performance and a 
willingness to be open to policy dialogue. 
 
In combining this ‘instrumental and formalistic’ approach to democracy with a 
securocratic mentality, the dialogue has proven problematic. The previous president 
ignored or attempted to subvert civil society – notably the human rights network, 
SHURONET. Equally he ignored the opposition parties who have since 2005 
controlled parliament. The problem for development has been that the state spends 
most of its paltry revenues on security. 
 
The Case for Recognition 
In 2001 a referendum in Somaliland showed 97 percent of the population in favour of 
independence, and Somaliland has essentially ruled itself, given the lack of a central 
government in Somalia. But getting recognition from the rest of the world has proved 
troublesome. African leaders are hesitant to acknowledge the claim for fear of stirring 
up more chaos in Somalia. They also do not want to encourage rebels elsewhere on 
the continent who desire independent states of their own. An African Union fact-
finding mission declared in 2005 that Somaliland's status was "unique and self-
justified in African political history," and that "the case should not be linked to the 
notion of 'opening a Pandora's box.' The International Crisis Group, recommended in 
a subsequent report "Somaliland, Time for African Union leadership" that the African 
Union address the issue soon "to prevent a deeply rooted dispute from evolving into 
an open conflict." The report called on the African Union to name a senior envoy to 
consult with key players and report back to the African Union's Peace and Security 
Council. In addition, the report called on the AU's Peace and Security Council to 
familiarise its members with the case of Somaliland. Finally it called on the AU, 
meanwhile, to grant Somaliland interim observer status. Essentially the report argued 
‘Is it fair to keep Somaliland hostage to events in Mogadishu and the surrounding 
areas or should Somaliland be rewarded for creating stability and democratic 
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governance out of a part of the chaos that is the failed state of Somalia?’ However 
those recommendations proved too sensitive and instead the African Union shelved 
the case where it has remained for the past for six years. 
 
On a purely technical reading, Somaliland probably has a stronger case for 
international recognition than does Southern Sudan, Eritrea or Kosovo. Somaliland 
was administered through most of the colonial period as a British protectorate, while 
other parts of the Somali territories were controlled by the Italians, the British in 
Kenya, Ethiopia, or the French in Djibouti. At independence, Somaliland even 
enjoyed several days of widely recognised sovereignty, before (willingly) joining with 
the ex-Italian territory in the south. Somaliland can therefore be described as a 
formerly independent state reasserting its independent international personality. 
 
Focussing specifically on the comparison between Somaliland and Southern Sudan, 
the major difference lies in the fact that there exists no ‘established state’ in Somalia 
which could legitimately, even grudgingly, give ‘some degree of consent’ to 
Somaliland’s separation. 
 
This leaves Somaliland in something of a dilemma: while international acceptance of 
Southern Sudan’s overwhelming support for independence holds enormous 
emotional and symbolic significance for many Somalilanders, they remain hostage to 
the chaos that has reigned for so long in the south. Regrettably, that situation has 
long cost Somaliland dear. With a recognised but ineffective and far from legitimate 
government (Transitional Federal Government – TFG) in the south holding the right 
to negotiate on behalf of the whole of the now defunct Somali Democratic Republic, 
Somaliland is prevented from accessing bilateral aid, and struggles to raise funds for 
essential state activities. 
 
It therefore occupies an invidious position: it has neither a functional relationship with 
a southern Somali state that is capable of accessing critical investment, nor can it 
access much of that investment itself. If it is to secure the recognition that would 
resolve that dilemma, it must argue the case for a further expansion in the criteria for 
recognised sovereignty. Somaliland has made impressive strides in establishing a 
viable democracy, so coupled with the evident will of the majority of the population, it 
has a case for arguing that other states should not stand in the way of its self-
determination. However, that argument demands a further expansion of the 
principles that were called on to justify recognition for other new states. 
 
The international will to make such an accommodation is seriously limited. 
Somaliland lies at the intersection of several geopolitical faultlines which tend to 
favour the status quo. Egypt prefers to hold onto the hope of a united Somalia as a 
bulwark against Ethiopia, and it is hard to see any new dispensation in Cairo altering 
that. Ethiopia is happy with a fragmented series of semi-stable Somali entities on its 
doorstep. The West is paranoid about an Islamist takeover in the south to the degree 
they cannot bear to entertain the thought of abandoning the TFG, although the EU 
has said that the TFG needs to relinquish power by the end of August 2011. The 
Islamists themselves believe fervently in a greater Somali caliphate. Even Uganda 
and Burundi make significant cash out of foreign sponsorship of peacekeeping troops 
and are happy to see that continue. While Somaliland's stability is valued by many of 
those (notably neighbours and the West), the appetite for recognition remains limited. 
 
A gradual process which we have dubbed 'incremental recognition' is perhaps the 
best available option. However, this too presents significant barriers. It requires a 
level of Somaliland diplomatic aptitude that has been notable by its absence in the 
past. The Somaliland state has long been too sparsely-resourced, governments too 
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unsophisticated in their approach to recognition, and the populace too paranoid 
about 'contact' with Somalia to allow the necessary subtlety in diplomatic terms. 
 
In the final analysis, this latter option still offers the best avenue for Somaliland, but it 
places great onus on the government to raise their game significantly. Perhaps even 
more problematically, it also requires a public relaxation of attitudes to engagement 
with those who are politically active in the south. To date, numerous initiatives 
designed to ‘share’ experiences or to discuss possible ways forward have been 
sabotaged by a public eager to see malign intent in every such contact. The fervent 
belief held by many Somalilanders and fanned by domestic media is that any 
meaningful discourse represents an underhand attempt to effect reunification with 
Somalia. 
 
While the hurdles are considerable, though, there are a number of factors playing in 
favour of this incremental strategy. Key international actors –including both the US 
and UK and some African voices – are showing signs of fatigue after successive and 
often dramatic policy failures in southern Somalia. This is yet to play out in the form 
of major policy shifts, but there have been minor adjustments (eg a dual-track policy 
announced by Johnnie Carson and Andrew Mitchell’s rather fudgy pledge to increase 
UK aid to Somaliland by a greater proportion than a promised hike in aid to the TFG 
– he promised it in Hargeisa but weaselled his way out of that promise while in 
Nairobi). There is a new and more energetic government in Somaliland, and even 
Kenya has started talking about offering greater support to ‘regional’ administrations. 
On top of that, the TFG’s mandate expires in August 2011. 
 
Now that a new government has been in place for almost a year, after presidential 
elections in June 2010, there are a number of questions that will determine 
fundamentally the ways in which traditional institutions interact with the (Western) 
norms of nation-state democracy. Clan will continue to play a significant yet dynamic 
role in the political realm, while external actors, from private, public and non-
governmental sectors, must also expand their involvement. There were hopes of the 
government effecting a change not just from the securocratic and non-transparent 
practices of former President Riyale, but in the nature of the state towards a more 
interventionist and pro-poor model. There has been some progress in this direction, 
but performance has been mixed. On the first day of the new regime, the government 
delivered on a pledge to abolish the unpopular security committees. These 
committees were originally established to address urgent issues of security in the 
wake of the civil war; these committees had been permitted to imprison without trial 
and they lay outside any due judicial process. A new National Security Board was 
established, to provide security, defend borders and fight against terrorism. The 
judiciary, however, remains ineffective, corrupt, and subject to executive pressure. It 
is also alleged to be corrupt and non-professional with untrained clerks acting as 
judges. A seasoned observer described the system as ‘a hell of a mess which will 
take a lot of cleaning up. It’s still based largely on judicial practice under Siyaad Barre 
– i.e. who has the most money wins’. The new government also appears almost as 
suspicious as the old one of independent journalists, shown by a series of arrests of 
journalists and editors on charges that were, at best, dubious. 
 
The position of women has been another key element in the fight to further and 
deepen democratisation and Kulmiye has, as well as its clan base, majority support 
among women, youth, civil society and diaspora. Activists cautiously welcomed the 
increase in female cabinet ministers from 5% to 20% but pointed out this still only 
means two ministers and an assistant minister (although the cabinet has shrunk in 
size). There is also a woman commissioner on the Human Rights Commission. The 
new (female) Minister for Labour and Social Affairs is, unlike her predecessor, open 
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to dialogue with civil society. Women’s groups welcomed these developments, with 
the umbrella network NAGAAD promptly submitting an advisory paper on gender 
issues to the government. However, women’s groups are looking for much more 
tangible progress and this still appears largely distant. There is, for example, little 
movement on key issues such as proposed 30% quotas for women in parliament. 
 
There has been an improved relationship with civil society. A new NGO Act defining 
roles and responsibilities for NGOs as well as giving them legal protection was 
signed into being while a number of new ministers have civil society backgrounds. 
Former NGO activists include one of the female cabinet members, Zamzam Abdi, 
now Minister of Higher Education and formerly Executive Director of the Committee 
of Concerned Somalis (CCS) and ex-Chair of the human rights network, 
SHURONET. The new Minister of Planning was himself a founding member of the 
NGO Somali Relief Association (SOMRA) in the UK in the early 90s, and has spent 
the past few years working with the private sector hawala (money transfer company), 
Dahabshiil. Early in his new ministerial role, he held his first coordination meeting 
with the UN and international NGOs and presented new guidelines for aid 
coordination. In addition, there is the promise of forums for domestic civil society to 
engage with government and to monitor performance, including input into the 
budgetary process. 
  
However there has been disquiet expressed over this new NGO law in that it could, 
according to aid workers and donors, undermine international humanitarian work. 
While establishing a legal framework for NGOs to ensure their activities are in line 
with the government's development priorities and to improve accountability and 
transparency is fine in principle, much of the wording of the law appears ambiguous.  
Foreign agencies working in Somaliland are particularly worried about article 35 (3), 
which states: "International NGOs shall not become implementers for other 
international NGOs and UN organisations working in the country." While the aim of 
encouraging international NGOs and UN agencies to work with local NGOs and local 
businesses for implementing projects to build their capacity, useful for when 
international NGOs leave is laudable, there are fears that a blanket application of the 
principle, rather than a case-by-case approach, could drastically reduce overall donor 
funding. Some programmes being carried out require specific technical expertise that 
is not easily available in-country. 
 
Before the elections, the (then Shadow) Foreign Minister spoke of taking a far more 
nuanced approach to Somaliland’s neighbours, including pursuing reconciliation with 
Somalia and Puntland, as well as with other Somali groups and neighbours in the 
Horn in general. This necessarily requires that Somaliland address specific 
sensitivities on the question of recognition, for which neighbours remain the key. 
 
In a recent talk in London, one of the authors floated the concept of ‘incremental 
recognition’ in which we suggest that Somaliland leaders engage in confidence-
building measures, such as pursuing the possibility of greater engagement with 
regional bodies such as the IGAD forum (Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development). The premise is that this would allow Somaliland themselves to 
assume a more active and self-directing role in the pursuit of recognition, setting 
modest incremental objectives that are nevertheless achievable, and should one day 
lead to a situation in which full recognition represents mere acceptance of an ipso 
facto condition. Such an approach would contrast with past tendencies to emphasise 
recognition as a one-stop solution requiring a single, substantial policy shift on the 
part of other nations. The new policy seemed to reap rewards with the unexpectedly 
positive presidential visit to Djibouti in which President Silanyo was awarded red 
carpet status as if he were a recognised head of state. The long-closed Somaliland 
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liaison office was also reopened, marking a shift from the rocky relations between 
Djibouti and the Riyale regime. It may be that this change is linked to the new fibre-
optic cable coming into Somaliland via Djibouti. A number of government advisers 
themselves have links with Djibouti, and there were accusations within Somaliland 
that the agreement had favoured Djibouti against Somaliland interests. 
Having initially viewed the new Somaliland government with suspicion, Ethiopia also 
hosted a Somaliland delegation led by Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, the new Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. In so doing they indicated a willingness to work with the new 
administration. Hargeisa has also seen a visit from the new UN Envoy to Somalia, 
apparently at the invitation of the Norwegian Refugee Council. Significantly, the 
Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub Maalim, also visited Sheikh Veterinary 
School and met the President, noting that his visit marked a new era in the 
relationship between IGAD and Somaliland. 
 
However, relations with Puntland have continued to be tense, with the contested 
sovereignty of areas of Sanaag and Sool complicated by recent accusations from 
Puntland that Somaliland was harbouring and indeed promoting the ‘terrorist’ 
Mohamed Said ‘Atom’. Puntland forces had clashed with Atom in the mountainous 
area of Galgala, and accused Somaliland variously of sending militia to fight 
alongside him and of sheltering him when he fled. The Somaliland account inevitably 
differed from this, with senior politicians declaring Atom a terrorist and insisting that 
the two territories were cooperating over terrorism. These claims were repeated to us 
when we spoke to the Somaliland President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
London in November 2010.  They suggested that the dispute was essentially 
between the Puntland administration and local clan groups. Since that date, the 
situation in the border areas with Ethiopia near the town of Buhodle has also 
deteriorated, with renewed fighting between Somaliland forces and those of a 
breakaway militia titling themselves SSC1 early in 2011 resulting in significant 
fatalities. The same group was responsible for the election day clash near Kala 
Baydh. 
 
A further significant problem lies in the seeming continuation of a position of the 
Riyale government in the form of suspicion of and attacks on press freedom. This 
started with the suspension twice of the right of the popular Somali cable broadcaster 
Universal TV to work in Somaliland in retaliation for having ‘treated Somaliland 
unfairly’. The first suspension was subsequently lifted, but was renewed when the 
broadcaster was caught displaying bodies from southern Somali areas and claiming 
that they were fatalities of the SSC clashes. The Chief Editor of the partisan Yool 
daily newspaper was also threatened by ministers and security personnel for 
unfavourable coverage. A further instance saw Mohamud Abdi Jama, the editor of 
the daily newspaper ‘Waaheen’2, sentenced to three years imprisonment for 
publishing articles which accused the government of nepotism and an official of 
having appointed his own clan members to posts. Mohamud was sentenced to three 
years in prison and fined. He was subsequently granted a presidential pardon after 
global pressure on the government and released after spending over a month in 
prison. He was then awarded the Free Press Africa Award for 2011 at the CNN 
Multichoice African journalist of the year ceremony.  
 
Other journalists from the Saxafi, Hargeisa Star, Ogaal and Yool newspapers are 
also facing charges of criminal defamation – all of which has attracted international 
                                               
1
 The initials refer to the areas of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, portions of which are claimed by 
clans opposed to Somaliland. 
2
 Waaheen belongs to Ahmed Hussein Essa, a long-time politician with good insider 
knowledge but with a combative past inside Kulmiye. 
 8 
criticism.  The National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) protested over 
continuing intimidation of journalists in Somaliland, following the arrest on 10 May of 
a reporter from the Hargeisa-based Haatuf daily newspaper, Ahmed Adan Hirsi, 
known as Ahmed Dhere, in Berbera. This appears to have happened after a 
complaint from Berbera district commissioner against the journalist. Hopes that the 
new administration would not resort systematically to the measures of the prior 
regime, which had a tendency to lock up perceived opponents, including journalists, 
for lengthy periods have begun to fade – even though the new media spokesperson 
for the government is himself an ex-journalist. It had been thought that there was a 
more intuitive understanding of the importance of an independent judiciary, press and 
civil society from the new government from the securocratic Riyale mindset. This is 
yet to be vindicated.  The presidential pardon granted to the Waaheen editor was 
welcome but did little to alter the perception that moves against the media tend to be 
far too arbitrary and open to political manipulation. There is thus a significant need for 
work on fully institutionalising the freedom of the media, particularly in such areas as 
making defamation a civil rather than a criminal offence, and in local governors being 
able to organise the arrest of journalists. Even though the new government is so far 
less guilty of unreasonable media suppression than its predecessors, some of the 
actions they have taken still amount to undue harassment. 
  
Perhaps this relates to the wider worries that commentators and people on the street 
see little evidence of a unifying vision. In the nearly twelve months since taking power 
the concentration appears to be on reshuffling the institutions and getting rid of 
supposedly corrupt civil servants, while creating new agencies such as the Anti 
Corruption Commission. Essentially some charge that Kulmiye did not have a plan 
for governing. This line holds that they concentrated too hard on winning the election 
on an anti-government platform and, despite the high expectations of the population, 
they are now weighed down by the day-to-day job of governing. One commentator 
opined that the President seems to be overwhelmed and that he lacks the stamina 
for the job, relying instead on others to do the work for him. 
 
We have had a year now to see whether such criticism is well-founded. Complaints 
about a lack of vision and unnecessary levels of negativity seem to hold some 
validity. Too many civil servants were fired for what appeared no fault of their own 
other than (inevitable) ties to the previous administration. In the process, competent 
as well as less able individuals were lost. Equally, there have been concerning 
indications that the government has lacked a consistent agenda, with ministers too 
willing to embark on action at odds with the positions of other members of the 
executive. It is possible that the anti-media moves described were a manifestation of 
this tendency. 
 
There is nevertheless donor goodwill. In September 2010, the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs announced a new policy on Somaliland that 
would see ‘aggressive’ engagement with the administrations there and in Puntland 
(Carson, 2010). Given that such engagement is likely to be highly focused on an anti-
terrorist/anti-political Islamist agenda, these words are not necessarily reassuring for 
Somalis with echoes of the previous use of surrogates to ‘police the badlands’. Can 
Somaliland try to use this to its own advantage? As it attempts to reach out more 
actively and to establish a more nuanced approach to international and regional 
players, increasing international acceptance of Somaliland as an autonomous 
political entity could assist significantly. The US shift is part of a ‘dual track’ strategy 
which will see the US continue to support the Mogadishu-based Transitional Federal 
Government, but which will also result in an increase in direct aid to Somaliland, so 
the possibility for this and similar adjustments in attitude to result in tangible benefit 
for Somaliland is real.  
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Donors have promised to channel an increased proportion of aid directly to 
Somaliland e,g, 40% of British aid to Somalia will go to Somaliland, amid talk of direct 
budget support for the government. If implemented, which has not yet happened, this 
would mark a significant shift in donor engagement with Somaliland, contributing 
materially to the process of incremental recognition mentioned above.  
 
Somaliland has a significant opportunity given the impending expiry of the mandate 
of the Transitional Federal Government in the south and the EU insisting that it 
resigns once its mandate expires. The TFG has long represented an explicit obstacle 
if Somaliland is to extend the depth and breadth of its formal engagement with the 
international community. Negotiation with donors over their future therefore 
represents a very real opportunity for Somaliland, along with those amongst the 
international diplomatic community who would like to see a change in the nature of 
that engagement, to leverage a further and more substantial enhancement in 
international acceptance of Somaliland. 
Conclusion 
The election of a fresh administration in Somaliland promised much and in the first 
part of their term they have delivered on some of that promise. Early moves to 
disband security committees and to improve relations with civil society were 
welcome, and some successes have been achieved in foreign policy. Set against 
these advances have been continued harassment of media representatives. 
Similarly, a policy of unnecessary replacement of civil servants provided fuel to those 
complaining that the administration was too narrowly focused on clan and political 
appointment. 
 
There is also some merit to the criticism that the government has failed to display a 
genuinely coherent leadership for the country. Again, this is an area in which the 
previous administration was signally poor, so setting a low benchmark. It is small 
comfort therefore that the new government has at least improved on that record. In 
future, they will need to be far more clear-sighted and long-term in their vision if they 
are to maximise their potential in garnering outside support and in sustaining the 
momentum for democracy and development. 
 
In terms of understanding the potential and nature of the Somaliland state as a 
catalyst for transformation, we need to note that in general there has been little 
perception of the state as a developmental entity. The promise, however, of free 
primary and intermediate education and doubling of teachers’ salaries along with 
those of other public servants, marks a move in that direction, although questions 
remain over the availability of resources. The focus hitherto has largely been on 
internal survival in the context of perceived external threat. Such a focus provided the 
previous regime with a seeming legitimacy to concentrate on stability and use the 
great desire of the population for post-civil-war peace to entrench itself in power and 
use that for economic gain. Clan has been the basis of social networks and safety 
nets, and largely the state has not attempted to capture that role in contrast to the 
‘flight from the state’ elsewhere, meaning greater space for social and economic 
interventions from citizens.  Ideas emanating from time to time in the diaspora on the 
more developmental and interventionist role of the state (but without the resources) 
may lead to contrasting views within the new government. There is, despite the lack 
of recognition, a greater than usual internal and external acceptance of the legitimacy 
of the state and an identification of the great mass of citizens with it (with the 
exception of the areas bordering Puntland). To that extent in contrast with large 
areas of Africa, there does appear to be greater congruence between identity, 
legitimacy and territory. Rather than the clichéd ‘hybrid’ state combining ‘traditional’ 
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and modernising forces, Somaliland has been shaped by a combination of and 
conflicts between ‘night watchmen’ and securocrats, and democratising and 
traditional or patriarchal forms. The balance of different social forces that underlie 
them is also shifting. The support base of the Kulmiye governing party appears 
progressive and developmental but the moves against the media show that it is 
entirely possible that state organs can too easily reflect the structural inheritance of 
the previous regime.  
 
Finally some possibly random thoughts on how useful Somaliland’s experience is for 
the very different case of South Sudan. Neither of us claims special expertise on the 
new Sudanese nation and both are chary of trying to cram comparisons that are not 
there. Firstly for South Sudan, recognition will be followed by state building – the 
reverse of Somaliland’s yet to be achieved case for recognition. It does as stated 
above give the opportunity for utilising well-understood indigenous forms free from 
outside formulae, but without significant resources. Secondly South Sudan can see 
that Somaliland has survived for 20 years in a hostile neighbourhood through strong 
congruence of identity, territory (mostly) and nation, but with clan and religion playing 
both centripetal and centrifugal roles.  A great many Somalilanders undoubtedly see 
South Sudan’s political recognition as achievement of precisely the primary objective 
they themselves have long held. This perspective simultaneously highlights the 
perceived injustice of non-recognition and fuels hopes that Somaliland success might 
lie just around the corner. Civil war brought both states into being albeit with very 
different trajectories. South Central Somalia is weak and ineffective whereas North 
Sudan can certainly been seen as manipulative and able to enforce its policies. It 
would seem that the one lesson that Somaliland might have for South Sudan is the 
importance of concentrating on incremental consolidation of the ‘building blocks’ of 
state. It is probably no stretch to consider the Somaliland experience: a resource-
poor government forced to proceed slowly, constantly renegotiating the terms under 
which its domestic polity has been willing to extend support or tolerance of its 
existence. This gradual and consensus-based process has been painfully slow with 
much of its rationale focused on the security of citizens rather than grand 
development plans. Certainly no Somaliland governnment has possessed the 
resources to institute such ambitious programmes. The Southern Sudanese 
administration too lacks non-physical resources, and arguably one of the challenges 
they face relates to the temptation inherent in possibly rich external support. 
Importantly, the South Sudan state must, as was the case in Somaliland, retain the 
support of a populace exhausted after years of conflict and under-development. 
While enthusiasm for independence runs strong at the moment, expectations are 
unrealistically high and tensions are probably masked rather than resolved. Just as 
Somaliland’s erstwhile SNM allies resorted to conflict themselves shortly after the 
1991 declaration of independence, the risk of latent disputes erupting into violence in 
South Sudan must logically be real. 
 
South Sudan has promised that it will not be a failed state and is seemingly aware 
that resources – both oil and external development funds – can be both a blessing 
and a curse; not least through ‘Dutch disease’. Both hold the basis for development 
through investment and outside expertise but also corruption – not that one needs oil 
for corruption. 
 
There are also dangers in the South Sudan situation in terms of their far greater 
foreign, including UN, presence in contrast to the largely correct rhetoric from 
Somaliland of ‘doing it on our own’. Without a well-thought through development 
plan, there is always the danger of becoming another ‘Donors’ Republic of 
Mozambique’. It would seem at present that there are certainly a list of priorities for 
South Sudan – rural development, good governance, service delivery, a new land 
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law, and, importantly, combating climate change. Again the lack of state resources in 
Somaliland meant that that nation was never confronted with these problems and the 
means to tackle them to any great extent, being forced instead to leave the process 
to civil society, donors and diaspora while itself concentrating on security and a form 
of state-building. This has meant that the Somaliland state has been able to avoid 
responsibility for tackling some very urgent problems. On the one hand, that 
avoidance was justified by circumstance, but on the other, it has meant that the state 
holds little capacity to address issues that in some instances would be best tackled 
through the institutions of a viable and functional state. 
 
There may be lessons – positive or negative – that Somaliland can take from 
watching (or indeed engaging with?) South Sudan as it attempts simultaneous 
nation-building and development. How South Sudan uses the expected $2 billion per 
annum from oil revenues plus outside investment and aid will be instructive. 
Somaliland has been highlighted for more aid but there needs to be a discursive 
Somali dialogue on priorities between government, donors, diaspora and civil society 
on such matters as ending high youth unemployment and other key challenges. Is 
downstream processing of livestock products etc possible? How does Somaliland 
give outsiders financial guarantees when remaining unrecognised? It is unlikely that 
South Sudan can provide the answer to these and other questions, but scrutiny of 
each others’ history could nevertheless be instructive. 
 
Michael Walls/ Steve Kibble 
7 June 2011 
